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NOTES

Functus Officio: Does the Doctrine
Apply in Labor Arbitration?
Teamsters Local 312 v. Matlack, Inc.'

I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine offunctus officio was developed at common
law in response to
concerns about the "solemnity ofjudgments" and the
effect of outside influences on
2
arbitrators' decisions. Although not strictly applied
in arbitration that is conducted
pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act,3
the doctrine offunctus officio
prevents an arbitrator from vacating, modifying, supplementing,
or correcting his
award. Most courts recognize three narrow exceptions
to the doctrine which allow
an arbitrator to revisit his award under limited circumstances.
This Note examines
the application of the "clarification exception" to
the doctrine in a labor dispute
setting and outlines an alternative method by which
this case could have been
resolved with minimal damage to the doctrine.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On September 7, 1995, the Teamsters Local 312 ("the
Union" or "Local 312")
brought a complaint against Matlack, Inc. ("Matlack")
in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to enforce
in its entirety an award that
the Union had obtained against Matlack following
an arbitration hearing.6 The
complaint was brought pursuant to §3 01(c) of the
Labor Management Relations
7
Act.

The Local 312 represents truck drivers and haulers employed
by Matlack in its
Bensalem, Pennsylvania, waste water transportation
terminal.8 As a condition of the
collective bargaining agreement between the Union
and Matlack, Matlack was
1. 118 F.3d 985 (3rd Cir. 1997).
2. Glass Workers Int'l Union v. Excelsior Foundry
Co., 56 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 1995).
3. Courier-Citizen Co. v. Boston Electrotypers Union
No. 11,702 F.2d 273, 279 (lst Cir. 1983).
4. Cadillac Uniform & Linen Supply, Inc. v. Union
de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, 920 F. Supp.
19, 21 (D. Puerto Rico 1996) (citing Courier-Citizen,
707 F.2d at 278).
5. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Omaha Indem. Co., 943
F.2d 327, 332 (3rd Cir. 1991).
6. Matlack, 118 F.3d at 990.
7. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act
§301(c), 29 U.S.C. §185 (1995), provides: For
the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against
labor organizations in the district courts of the
United States, district courts shall be deemed to have
jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in any
district in which such organization maintains its principal
office, or (2) in any district in which its duly
authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing
or acting for employee members.
8. Matlack, 118 F.3d at 986.
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prohibited from diverting or subcontracting to other facilities any work which was
already being handled by the Bensalem drivers and haulers, as well as any work that
might be assigned to the Bensalem workers at a later date.9 The bargaining
agreement also provided for grievance procedures to be followed by the parties in
°
the event that a complaint arose between the Union and Matlack."
When the Local 312 employees discovered what appeared to be a violation of
the "work preservation" provision, the Union instituted the initial step in the
grievance process: the Union President filed a grievance letter with Matlack
indicating his belief that Matlack was violating the collective bargaining agreement
by diverting work originating in the Northern Region to another facility." In a
meeting with Matlack's Bensalem Terminal Manager, the Union President made a
handwritten amendment to his grievance letter which purported to expand the scope
of the complaint to include the diversion of any work which had been assigned to the
Bensalem terminal as opposed to work originating solely in the Northern Region.2
The Terminal Manager did not object to the handwritten amendment to the grievance
letter, but nevertheless refused to sign it. 13
Following unsuccessful attempts to resolve the issue, the Union and Matlack
agreed to arbitration before Arbitrator Charles D. Long.' 4 The arbitration covered
two main issues: (1) procedural issues as to whether the Union had filed its grievance
within the time limitation outlined in §7 of the agreement and whether the grievance
extended beyond work originating in the Northern Region, and (2) a substantive
9. Id. at 986. Article 50.1 of the collective bargaining agreement, the "work preservation"
provision, provides as follows:
For the purpose of preserving work and job opportunities for the
employees covered by this Agreement, the Employer agrees that no operation,
work or services of the kind, nature or type covered by, or presently performed
or hereafter assigned to the collective bargaining unit by the Employer will be
subcontracted, transferred, leased, diverted, assigned or conveyed in full or in part
(hereinafter referred to as "divert" or "subcontract"), by the Employer to any other
plant, business, person, or non-unit employees, or to any other mode of operation,
unless specifically provided and permitted in this Agreement.
In addition, the Employer agrees that it will not, as hereinafter set forth,
subcontract or divert the work presently performed by or hereafter assigned to, its
employees to other business entities owned and/or controlled by the Employer,
or its parent, subsidiaries, or affiliates.
10. Id. at 987. Section 7.2 of the Agreement, in pertinent part, provides for the steps that a party must
follow when making a complaint:
Step 1: All grievances must be made known in writing to the other party within
seven (7) working days after the reason for such grievance has occurred .....
Step 2: If the disposition of the matter by the Terminal Manager in charge, or his
duly authorized representative, is not satisfactory, the matter must be taken up by
the Business Agent, and the Employer's Regional Representative, or other
representatives of the Employer with authority to act, within five (5) working
days of the written disposition set forth in Step I ...
Step 3: If the disposition of the matter by the Regional Representative or other
representatives of the employer with authority to act, is not satisfactory either
party has the right to file its grievance with the Joint Committee. .
11. Id. The Northern Region consisted primarily of loads originating in Muscatine, Iowa.
12. Id. The amendment, dated August 9, 1994, read: "To any waste water that came into and out of
this terminal!" (emphasis added).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 988.
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issue as to whether Matlack had violated the "work preservation" provision of
Article 50.1.'" During the course of the hearing, Matlack indicated that it was not
prepared to address and argue the substantive issue.' 6 Based on Matlack's statement,
Arbitrator Long informed the parties that he would permit questioning on both the
procedural and substantive issues, but would only decide the procedural issues.' 7
Any decision by Long with respect to the alleged "work preservation" violation
would be delayed until a later date at which time Matlack would be permitted to
reopen the hearing and address the substantive issue.'"
Despite his words to the contrary, Arbitrator Long rendered a decision in favor
of the Union on both the procedural and substantive questions without giving
Matlack an opportunity to reopen the hearing. 9 This resulted in voluminous
correspondence between all of the parties involved, including Long, who eventually
withdrew as arbitrator.20 In a letter to both parties following his withdrawal, Long
purported to clarify where he believed the case stood in the aftermath of his
decision.2' The letter indicated that Long had intended to resolve the procedural
issues but had not intended to render a decision with respect to Matlack's alleged
violation of the "work preservation" provision. 2 As a result of Long's clarification,
Matlack refused to comply with the written terms of the award, and the Union filed
its complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
The Union argued that Arbitrator Long's award was final and entitled to
deference by the court.24 Matlack countered by claiming that Long's withdrawal as

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.

22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 989. Long's written award indicated that his decision would address four issues:
1. Is the grievance of June 1, 1994, timely filed pursuant to Article 7 § 7.2 of the
collective bargaining agreement?
2. Is the amendment of August 9, 1994, timely and, otherwise, valid?
3. If not, is the grievance filed on June 1, 1994, limited solely to the loads of
waste water originating in Muscatine, Iowa?
4. If it is determined that the grievance is timely filed, has there been a violation
of Article 50 of the collective bargaining agreement, as alleged?
Id.
Id. at 990. Long's letter read as follows:
My decision to withdraw from this matter concerned a misunderstanding.
concerning the procedure to be followed prior to a decision resolving that the
substantive portion of the issue which is separate and unrelated to that portion of
the issue concerning the scope of the grievance. Consistent with the record at the
close of the hearing on April 27, 1995, it was my intent to leave the matter in the
following posture:
1. A binding decision dated June 13, 1995, extending the scope of the underlying
substantive issue to include the grievance on June I, 1995, as amended during the
step 2 grievance meeting on August 9, 1995.
2. No decision concerning the underlying substantive issue of whether the
Employer's conduct violated Article 50, Subcontracting, of the collective
bargaining agreement, as alleged.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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arbitrator in combination with his subsequent letter of clarification rendered his
decision void and entitled Matlack to a new arbitration proceeding." Both parties
made motions for summary judgment in which they articulated their respective
positions.26 In light of Long's award, his clarification letter, and testimony from a
deposition in which Long stated that he had not communicated to either party that
the award had been vacated, the district court declined to grant summary judgment
in favor of either party. 27 The court requested that Long testify in an evidentiary
hearing in order to clarify some of the court's uncertainties with respect to his
intent. 2' Following Long's testimony, the district court found that his statements
during the hearing had led Matlack to believe that it would be permitted to reopen
29
the proceeding and admit evidence before the substantive issue was decided. As
such, Long's award resulted from a procedural irregularity which necessitated that
the portion of the award which decided on the substantive issue be vacated and
remanded; however, his decision with respect to the "timeliness and scope of the
grievance" remained enforceable.30
The Union appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of
3
Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed. The Third Circuit focused its
affirmance on two legal issues: whether the doctrine offunctus officio prevented the
district court from examining Long's letter of clarification when deciding whether
a procedural irregularity existed and whether the district court had the power to
2
vacate the portion of the award which resulted from the irregularity. The court
identified three exceptions to the doctrine of functus officio as well3 as several
methods by which arbitration decisions may be set aside at common law.1 The court
held that when a court is presented with a question of a fundamental procedural
irregularity and an arbitrator has issued a post-award comment in order to clarify his
intended award, the doctrine offunctus officio will not prevent the district court from
34
considering the post-award comment. The court also held that by deciding on the
substantive issue after indicating that he would not do so, Arbitrator Long made a

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Teamster's Local 312 v. Matlack, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 482, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 487.
31. Matlack, 118 F.3d at 996.
32. Id. at 990 ("The doctrine offunctus officio.., was applied strictly at common law to prevent an
arbitrator from in any way revising, reexamining, or supplementing his award.").
33. "The doctrine's [exceptions are]: (1) an arbitrator can correct a mistake which is apparent on the
face of his award; (2) where the award does not adjudicate an issue which has been submitted, then as
to such issue the arbitrator has not exhausted his function and it remains open to him for subsequent
determination; and (3) where the award, although seemingly complete, leaves doubt whether the
submission has been fully executed, an ambiguity arises which the arbitrator is entitled to clarify." Id.
at 995. In addition, "at common law, an arbitration award may be set aside where there is an adequate
showing of fraud, partiality, misconduct, violation of a specific command of law, or vagueness rendering
enforcement impractical, or a showing that enforcement would be contrary to public policy...Procedural
irregularities...may also result in such fundamental unfairness as to warrant the vacation of an arbitral
award." Id. at 995.
34. Id. at 996.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1998/iss1/6

4

1998]

Markel: Markel: Functus Officio: Does the Doctrine Apply in Labor Arbitration
Functus Officio: Does the Doctrine Apply in Labor Arbitration?

57

fundamental procedural error which warranted the vacation of the substantive
portion of the award."
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Functus officio means "having fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or
accomplished the purpose, and therefore of no further force or authority. 3 6 When
the term is used with respect to arbitration awards, it refers to a "common law
principle that once an arbitrator has made and published a final award his authority
is exhausted and he is functus officio and can do nothing more in regard to the
subject matter of the arbitration. 3 7 Historically, the doctrine has been strictly
applied at common law to prevent an arbitrator from vacating, modifying,
supplementing, or correcting his award.38 In order forfunctus officio to apply, the
award must be executed by the arbitrator and delivered or declared.39
The doctrine was judicially developed in response to three basic policy
concerns.4 0 The first was the original hostility of judges towards the use of
arbitration to resolve disputes." Judges were reluctant to allow individuals who
were not judicial officers and who served only sporadically to change their rulings.42
This judicial hostility has been replaced by a strong federal policy favoring
arbitration.43
The second reason for advancing a "policy of finality" was derived from the
"primitive view of the solemnity of all judgments. '44 In practice,
this policy has
ancient origins and operates to forbid the alteration of any judicial records.45 Finally,
and most importantly, the doctrine offunctus officio developed from the fear that an
arbitrator is not as insulated as a judge and could be convinced by "the potential evil
of outside communication and unilateral influence" to re-examine a final decision.46
In other words, it was felt that the doctrine would prevent arbitrators from being
influenced, or perhaps even coerced, by communication with the parties or other
outside sources.47 This is still recognized among jurisdictions as a valid concern
surrounding the process of arbitration.48

35. Id.
36. Functus Officio is "a task performed; having fulfilled the function, discharged the office, or
accomplished the purpose, and therefore of no further official authority. Applied to an officer whose
term has expired and who has consequently no further official authority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
606 (5th ed. 1979).
37. La Vale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569, 572 (3rd Cir. 1967).
38. Cadillac Uniform & Linen Supply, Inc. v. Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, 920 F. Supp.
19, 21 (D. Puerto Rico 1996).
39. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Ideal Cement Co., 762 F.2d 837, 842 (10th Cir. 1985).
40. Glass Workers Int'l Union v. Excelsior Foundry Co., 56 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 1995).
41. Cadillac Unif & Linen Supply, Inc., 920 F. Supp. at 21.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 23.
44. La Vale Plaza, Inc. v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 378 F.2d 569, 572 (3rd Cir. 1967).
45. Id.
46. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Silver State Disposal Serv., Inc., 109 F.3d 1409, 1411 (9th Cir.
1997) (quoting La Vale Plaza, Inc., 378 F.2d at 572).
47. Id.
48. GlassWorkers Int'l Union, 56 F.3d at 847.
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The status and application offunctus officio in labor arbitration pursuant to the
Labor Management Relations Act became muddied when the United States Supreme
Court ruled that federal courts have the authority to fashion substantive law with
respect to labor relations. 9 Since that time, federal courts fashioning such law have
refused to strictly apply the doctrine offunctus officio." These courts have either
considered the doctrine irrelevant or have recognized exceptions to its strict
application."'
Most courts agree that there are only three exceptions to the strict application
offunctus officio to arbitration awards.52 The first exception allows an arbitrator to
"correct a mistake which is apparent on the face of his award."53 This exception is
designed to allow the arbitrator to correct the award in"cases of clerical mistakes or
mistakes
obvious errors of arithmetic computation," but
54 does not "apply to alleged
where extraneous facts must be considered.,
The second exception applies "where the award does not adjudicate an issue
which has been submitted."" The rationale behind this exception is that if the
arbitrator has not adjudicated the issue, he has not "exhausted his function and it
56
Because there has been no
remains open to him for subsequent determination.
is no more vulnerable to
scenario
this
adjudication of the issue, an arbitrator in
arbitration proceeding. 7
the
throughout
be
normally
would
he
outside influence than
The third exception provides that "where the award, although seemingly
complete, leaves doubt as to whether the submission has been fully executed, an
5
ambiguity arises which the arbitrator is entitled to clarify." " It is this exception, and
its application by the court in Matlack, which has created doubt as to when
clarification is appropriate and useful in light of the policy concerns addressed
above.59

IV. INSTANT DECISION

In Matlack, the court began its analysis by examining the doctrine of functus
officio to determine whether it should have operated to preclude the district court
6
from considering Arbitrator Long's letter of clarification. ' The court determined
that the doctrine is still viable in actions brought pursuant to §301(c) of the Labor

49. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §301 (c), 29 U.S.C. §185 (1995); Textile
Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 450-51 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
50. Courier-Citizen Co. v. Boston Electrotypers Union No. 11, 702 F.2d 273, 279 (1st Cir. 1983);
Cadillac Unif.& Linen Supply, Inc., 920 F. Supp. at 21.
51. Ideal Cement Co., 762 F.2d at 842 & n.3.
52. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Omaha Indem. Co., 943 F.2d 327, 332 (3rd Cir. 1991).
53. Id.
54. Matlack, 118 F.3d at 992.
55. ColonialPenn Ins. Co., 943 F.2d at 332.
56. Id.
57. Matlack, 118 F.3d at 992.
58. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 943 F.2d at 332.
59. Matlack, 118 F.3d at 992.
60. Id. at 991-93.
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Management Relations Act.6 This finding was based primarily on the continuing
concern over an arbitrator's vulnerability to outside influence.62
The court's discussion of functus officio included an analysis of the three
recognized exceptions to the doctrine. 63 After considering each, the court placed the
circumstances of Matlack within the "clarification exception" which "entitles an
arbitrator to clarify an ambiguity in a seemingly complete award where there is
doubt whether the submission has been fully executed."' The court reasoned that
"if the functus officio doctrine were to prevent parties from clarifying what they
perceive to be a fundamental procedural irregularity, the result would be a gap in the
system of arbitral justice that would make very little sense., 65 Citing Eighth and
Tenth Circuit decisions in favor of this interpretation, the court determined that the
clarification exception was properly applied to the fact pattern of the instant case.66
It concluded that because the tapes of the proceedings were inaudible in parts and
incomplete, and because the letter addressed procedural issues unrelated to the merits
of the controversy (thus eliminating the concern over outside influence), the doctrine
of functus officio did not operate to preclude the district court from considering
67
Arbitrator Long's clarification letter.
With this issue determined, the court moved on to consider whether the
substantive portion of the award was properly vacated by the district court.68 It noted
that at common law, an arbitration award may be set aside due to a showing of
procedural irregularity, fraud, partiality, misconduct, violation of a specific
command of law, vagueness rendering enforcement impractical, or a showing that
enforcement would be contrary to public policy. 69 The court then proceeded to
analyze cases, and their specific circumstances, in which procedural irregularities
warranted vacation.70 It also examined the Federal Arbitration Act, which was not
binding in Matlack, in order to analyze by analogy using examples of when
procedural irregularities have required that the arbitration award be vacated under
the FAA. 7' Based on this analysis, the court concluded that because Arbitrator Long
told the parties he would not be deciding the substantive issue at that stage, and
because Matlack was given no opportunity to present evidence on the merits of the
case, Matlack's right to notice and opportunity to be heard in an adversarial
proceeding was "severely impeded. '72 As a consequence, Arbitrator Long's

61. 29 U.S.C. §185 (1994); Matlack, 118 F.3d at 992.

62. Id. at 991.
63. Id. at 991-92.
64. Id. at 992.
65. Id. at 993.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 994.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 995.
70. Id. (discussing Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Am. Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961);
Harvey Aluminum v. United Steelworkers of Am., 263 F. Supp. 488 (C.D. Cal. 1967); and Int'l Bhd.
of Elec. Workers v. WGN of Colorado, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 64 (D. Colo. 1985)).

71. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §10 (1994).; Matlack, 118 F.3d at 995. The cases explored by
the court were Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reinsurance Co., Ltd., 868 F.2d 52, 56-57
(3rd Cir. 1989); Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 599
(3rd Cir.); and Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 685 (11 th Cir.).
72. Id. at 996.
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resolution of the substantive issue constituted a fundamental procedural irregularity,
and the district court was properly justified in its vacation of that portion of the
award. 3

V. COMMENT

In most cases, it is clear that the doctrine offunctus officio provides at least
three benefits. First, it preserves the solemnity of judgments, and second, it helps to
protect an arbitrator's award from outside communication or influence.74 The third
benefit, though not specifically mentioned by the courts, is that the doctrine protects
the reliance of the parties by offering an assurance that the award will not be altered
unless specific circumstances exist.
Despite its usefulness in addressing these concerns, the advantages of the
doctrine can be negated if it is applied too rigidly. A strict application offunctus
officio would prevent an arbitrator from considering a party's motion for
reconsideration, clarification, amendment, or other modification.75 This result would
leave the parties with no avenue to resolve problems and would result in "a gap in
the system of arbitral justice that would make very little sense., 7 6 An examination
of the practices of the judges serving under King Edward I provides a historical
example of this "gap. 77 King Edward I applied a strict policy preventing judges
from erasing or altering their records even in the case of a manifest mistake. 7' The
fines for doing so were so enormous that judges refused to amend their judgments
to be "agreeable to truth", stating that "even palpable errors ...were too sacred to
be rectified or called in question., 79 Since there was no avenue by which to appeal,
their approach worked obvious injustices on the parties which came before them and
is very similar to the results which would be required by a strict application of
functus officio.
The recognized exceptions tofunctus officio are applied in an effort to prevent
the inflexibility and inherent unfairness present in a system like King Edward's. °
In order to balance the need for flexibility with the need for continuity and
reliability, the three exceptions were narrowly drawn and, as a result, are to be
narrowly applied."1
Although the Matlack court recognizes that the exceptions are narrowly drawn,
it proceeds to broaden the clarification exception beyond its defined scope. 2 The
clarification exception applies "where the award, although seemingly complete,
leaves doubt whether the submission has been fully executed," resulting in an

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
La Vale Plaza, Inc., 378 F.2d at 572.
Glass Workers Int l Union, 56 F.3d at 847.
Id.
La Vale Plaza,Inc., 378 F.2d at 572.
Id. at 572 & n.15. (citing 3 Blackstone Commentaries, 409-410).
Id.
Glass Workers Int' Union, 56 F.3d at 847.
Matlack, 118 F.3d at 992.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1998/iss1/6

8

Markel: Markel: Functus Officio: Does the Doctrine Apply in Labor Arbitration
1998] Functus Officio."Does the DoctrineApply in Labor Arbitration?

61

ambiguity which the arbitrator is entitled to clarify.83 In Matlack, the defendant's
original complaint was that Arbitrator Long had rendered a decision with respect to
the substantive issue despite the fact that he had said he would not do so.8 " Neither
party indicated a belief that the award was incomplete or that the submission was not
fully executed, as required by the exception.85 If anything, Matlack's complaint was
that the award was more complete than it should have been. 6 As such, the elements
necessary to allow Arbitrator Long's clarification were not present in the instant
case, and the clarification exception to thefunctus officio doctrine was improperly
applied.
While the application of the clarification exception was improper, it was also
unnecessary in order for the court to reach its desired result. Arbitration awards may
be set aside by a court for a variety of reasons, including fundamental procedural
irregularity.17 Although the Matlack court rejects this approach, it appears as if
procedural irregularity could have easily been ascertained from tapes of the hearing
despite the fact that they were inaudible or incomplete in parts.88 In any event,
expanding the scope of procedural irregularity to encompass the facts of the instant
case would have been more appropriate and had less of an impact on the arbitration
process than the expansion of the clarification exception.
The broad application of the clarification exception only serves to undermine
a doctrine which is already "hanging on by its fingernails."' 9 In Matlack, the court's
application of the clarification exception essentially enabled Arbitrator Long to
reverse his initial ruling by means of the clarification letter considered by the court.9'
This clear violates the spirit of the doctrine offunctus officio which seeks to prevent
arbitrators from reexamining or altering their determinations. 9' Although Arbitrator
Long did not write his letter in an attempt to retry the issue on its merits or to change
his decision to favor Matlack, he did attempt to alter his award by saying that he had
not intended to resolve the substantive issue.92 This "alteration" is not covered under
any of the threefunctus officio exceptions as they are commonly interpreted: the
letter did not attempt to correct a clerical or arithmetic error, to resolve an issue
which had not previously been resolved, or to clarify an ambiguity in the "seemingly
complete" award.93 Rather, its sole purpose was to abandon a clear ruling where no
ruling should have been rendered.
Forcing the Matlack facts to fit into the confines of the clarification exception
chips away at the foundation underlying thefunctus officio doctrine. Although the
expansion of the exception in Matlack helps the court to reach an arguably correct
decision, the exceptions were not intended to be broadly applied. 94 In fact, broad

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

La Vale Plaza, Inc., 378 F.2d at 573.
Matlack, 118 F.3d at 989.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 988-89, 993-94.
Glass Workers lnt'7 Union, 56 F.3d at 846.
Matlack, 118 F.3d 985.
Domino Group, Inc. v. Charlie Parker Mem' Found., 985 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1993).
Matlack, 118 F.3d at 990.
Id. at 992.
Id.
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applications will renderfunctus officio unable to serve the purposes for which it was
designed. Under Matlack, an arbitrator could be influenced by outside sources to
write a letter claiming that he never intended to make a ruling on a particular issue.
Allowing outside influences to seep into an arbitrator's decision or subsequent
communications in this way is contrary to the doctrine's most important goal:
protecting arbitrators and insulating their decisions from improper influences."
In Local P-9 v. George Hormel & Co., 96 the Eighth Circuit provided an
example of how the instant case could have been resolved without resorting to the
distortion of thefunctus officio doctrine. In Hormel, the company and the union
submitted to binding arbitration in order to resolve a dispute over a new work
schedule. 97 The problem arose when the original award in favor of the Union was
supplanted by an amended award in favor of Hormel. 98 The Union claimed that the
first award was final and could not be reconsidered by the arbitrator because he was
functus officio. 99 Hormel claimed that the first award was a draft and offered an
affidavit by the arbitrator in which he made two assertions."°° First, he stated that his
intention was that the first award be merely a draft.1t' His second assertion was that
he had advised the parties at the first hearing that his initial award would be
provisional." 2 The court concluded that the arbitrator's first statement indicating
intent was inadmissible because "absent the consent of the parties, it is generally
improper for an arbitrator to interpret, impeach or explain a final and binding
award.' 0 3 However, the court allowed the consideration of the second statement,
stating that it did not "impeach the initial award or explain the arbitrator's decisionmaking process, but [that it] merely describe[d] the procedural process which the
arbitrator allegedly told the parties he would follow."'0 4 The court ruled that the
portion of the arbitrator's affidavit dealing with the procedural process must be
considered with all of the other evidence to determine whether the award was final
or provisional. 05
Applying Hormel to the instant case, the Matlack court could have refused to
consider Arbitrator Long's clarification letter, which essentially impeaches and
explains his award. Instead, the court could have focused on determining what
procedural process was agreed upon by the parties by use of the parties' testimony,
Arbitrator Long's testimony, and the tapes of the arbitration hearing. When
compiled, this evidence would probably have indicated that the procedural issue was
the only issue that was supposed to be decided following the first hearing. On that
basis, the court could have found that Arbitrator Long's resolution of the substantive
issue constituted a procedural irregularity justifying vacation. If the Matlack court
had adopted the Hormel analysis instead of the expanded clarification exception, the

95. Silver State Disposal Service, Inc., 109 F.3d at 1411.
96. 776 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1985).
97. Id. at 1394.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1395.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1395-96.
105. Id. at 1396.
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doctrine offunctus officio would remain a limited but effective tool in the Third
Circuit.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although ultimately reaching an arguably correct result, the analysis of the
Matlack court has further damaged the fragile doctrine offunctus officio. By
expanding the narrow clarification exception to encompass the facts in Matlack, the
court has eroded the protection that the doctrine provides against outside influence
over arbitrators thus undermining its primary purpose. Perhaps the Third Circuit
could prevent additional damage to the doctrine in similar cases by applying the
"procedural process" analysis of the Eighth Circuit in Hormel,rather than
expanding
the exceptions tofunctus officio beyond their intended scope.
AMY MARKEL
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